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LAWRENCE G. BECKER

anthropology, where one finds varieties of ownership quite foreign to
our ordinary notions .
How minimal a set of these elements can count as a variety of own ..
ership in law need not trouble us long . (The notion of a moral prop
r
erty right is more complicated, and I shall not deal with it here . ) Fo.
:,,;.;·,.:,:,,u,,
propeity rights in law we may argue as follows: the final four ei�i;l;;
ments are not rights at all and so obviously cannot stand alone as;tr�;
, va�iety of property rights.. The �ight to security see1:1s similarly pa�t'!�;i
_
_
s1t1c on other elements: Immumty from expropnat10n of what ngltl?;i,;
is always a question that must be answered in applying this elemeri'ttt�
So it too cannot stand alone .. But I suggest that any of the remainirlg.){
eight rights (possession, use, management, income, consumption d,'J:.;;;"
destruction, modification, alienation, and transmission) can stand {t)f{
a variety of legal ownership when it is supplemented by some versiop}{'
of the right to security. That is, I suggest (on the bases of nothing)\
stronger than my understanding of English) that if anyone holds eve�ij
one of these eight rights plus security-and therefore any bundle of{
rights that includes one of the eight plus security-then it make �.\
sense to say that that person has a property right.. (I assume that any
of these rights that is not secured-that is, that is subject to expropri
ation by the state at any time, by any process, for any reason-would
not count as a private property right..) No doubt the thought of a per
son having the right to consume or destroy but not to possess is
strange .. But it is not necessarily a contradiction; and surely it consti
tutes what could reasonably be called a property right. Similarly for
the others..
The varieties of property rights, then, consist of any set of the thir
teen elements that includes at least one of the first eight plus security .
There are 4,080 such combinations .. 12 Full ownership, as I have said,
is the concatenation of all the elements . Full exclusive ownership is
full ownership, by an individual or a group, in cases where no other
individual or group has any form of ownership in the same thing..
With these definitional matters out of the way, I want to turn to a
final preliminary: a summary of the moral arguments for property at
the level of general justification .
•,,"o•,,,�>-i.,'

THE GENERAL JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS

At the outset of this chapter, I urged a distinction between the
moral basis of property and the moral arguments for it .. I want now
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to review the moral arguments (at the level of general justification) as
a preface to what I have to say about the moral basis .. This is neces
sary not only because the moral basis contributes to the general justi
fication of property but also because the problems raised by the gen
eral justifications-what I call the "coordination problem" and the
"compatibility requirement" (see below)-partly define the ways in
which the moral basis is relevant to the process of specific and partic
ular justification. And one of the aims of this paper is the broadening
of philosophical discussion to include more work on specific and par
ticdlar justification .
It should be noted that throughout what follows I am speaking of
·· the justification of an institution of pdvate property-even when the
modifie1 "private" is not used. When I speak of public ownership, I
will always use an appropriate adjective.
The Plurality of General.Justifications.
I have argued in Property Rzghts 18 that there are at least four
sound and independent lines of general justification for private
property .
The first may be called the Locke-Mill version of the labor theory.
It is essentially a "why not?" argument, asserting that when fabor
tproduces something that would otherwise not have existed, and wl).en
:I{that labor is beyond what morality requires of the laborer, and when
t;)lothers suffer no loss from being excluded from enjoying the fruits of
�j;j�he labor, then property rights for the laborer (in the fruits of the
f);(�)abor) can be justified .
'.'.'1i{ The second line of general justification may be called the labor
:}ijq_esert version of the labor themy.. It holds that when labor produces
i;f�something of value to others-something beyond what morality re.
ti\9mres the laborers to produce-then the laborer deserves some benei${¾'.:fit for it. Sometimes the only (or most) appropriate benefit is a prop
;;f;\ehy right in the things produced (or in something else of value).
rttl�'hen this is the case' property rights can be justified .
,.nd7 · The third line of general justification consists of a complex of con
siderations of utility, framed in terms either of economic efficiency or
of political and social stability .. All of these considerations are directed
to the task of showing that a system of property rights is necessary for
human happiness . This is essentially Hume's argument, complicated
by the later developments of utilitarianism and economic theory ..
The final line of general justification may be called the argument
from political liberty . It assumes (as does the utility argument) that
,�(:·'. ,,,)

